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NOTES
ZONING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS OF ADULT ENTERTAINMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Although protected by the first amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, adult entertainment' businesses, such as adult movie theaters2 and
adult bookstores,3 have been under public and legislative attack for a num-
ber of years. Initially, state legislatures utilized public nuisance statutes4
i. Adult entertainment as used in this note is limited primarily to nonobscene adult
movie theaters and adult bookstores. The entertainment provided by adult movie theaters and
bookstores is entertainment that may be sexually pervasive or erotic but nonobscene under the
obscenity standard established in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Obscene material is
a category of expression not deserving of constitutional first amendment protection. Material is
considered obscene and therefore not protected by the first amendment if:
(a) "the average person applying contemporary standards" would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) [if] the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) [if] the work, taken as a whole lacks any serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
2. See, e.g., F. STROM, ZONING CONTROL OF SEX BUSINESSEs 50, app. A (1977), for an
example of how the City of Detroit defined an adult movie theater.
Adult Motion Picture Theater
An enclosed building with a capacity of 50 or more persons used for presenting ma-
terial distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or
relating to "Specified Sexual Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas" (as described
below), for observation by patrons therein.
Id.
3. See, e.g., id. for an example of how the City of Detroit defined an adult bookstore.
Adult Book Store
An establishment having as a substantial or significant portion of its stock in trade,
books, magazines, and other periodicals which are distinguished by their emphasis on
matter depicting, describing or relating to "Specified Sexual Activities" or "Specified
Anatomical Areas" (as defined below), or an establishment with a segment or section
devoted to the sale or display of such material.
Id.
4. Public nuisance is defined as "[a] condition dangerous to health, offensive to commu-
nity moral standards, or unlawfully obstructing the public in the free use of public property."
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and stringent licensing provisions 5 in an attempt to indirectly control the
distribution of adult entertainment through regulating or banning obscen-
ity.' However, state and lower federal courts have been in disagreement as
to the constitutionality of such provisions when the scope of a provision had
the potential to extend beyond the mere prohibition of obscenity and could
intrude into the realm of protected speech.7 The adult only businesses that
are the subject of this note deal with sexually oriented material that is con-
stitutionally protected and thus not properly dealt with under traditional
nuisance provisions.8
More recently, restrictive zoning laws have become an effective means
by which to control adult entertainment within a municipality.9 Each mu-
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1107 (5th ed. 1979). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7201-
7203 (Supp. 1986) (preventing the distribution of obscene materials as defined by the Supreme
Court in Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
5. See 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 17.05 (3d ed. 1986) (general
discussion of licenses and special use permits in the regulation of adult entertainment).
6. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). The court in Roth held that
obscenity, as a narrow category of speech, was not the type of speech deserving of constitu-
tional protection under the first amendment. The slight social value, if any, that may be de-
rived from obscenity is clearly outweighed by the social interests of public order and morality.
Id. See also Note, Pornography, Padlocks and Prior Restraints: The Constitutional Limits of
the Nuisance Power, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1478, 1478 n.4 (1983) (for a list of statutes regulat-
ing obscenity by allowing for blanket injunctions against obscene material). For a further dis-
cussion of the application of public nuisance statutes to obscenity, see generally Houge, Regu-
lating Obscenity Through the Power to Define and Abate Nuisances, 14 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1 (1978).
7. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487. The Court stated that "sex and obscenity are not synony-
mous." Id. The portrayal of sex as a form of literary or artistic expression is properly within
the protection of the first amendment. Obscenity, on the other hand, portrays sex in a manner
only appealing to the receiver's prurient interests. Id. See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City
of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 685, 690 (1968) (invalidating an overbroad licensing statute that
allows for erratic administration); Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education of Ohio,
346 U.S. 587 (1954). For a further complete discussion of prior restraints on free speech, see
Smith, Prior Restraint: Original Intentions and Modern Interpretations, 28 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 439 (1987); Note, Injunctions Pursuant to Public Nuisance Obscenity Statutes and the
Doctrine of Prior Restraints, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 775, 796 (1983-84) [hereinafter Injunctions];
Note, supra note 6, at 1478-79 (the prior restraint effect on speech imposed by public nuisance
laws creates an impermissible chilling effect on expression protected under the first
amendment).
8. F. STROM, supra note 2, at 3-4, apps. B, F-J (compilation of restrictive ordinances not
based on obscenity from Boston; Chicago; Dallas; Oakland; Marion County, Ind.; and Prince
Georges County, Md.).
9. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (adult movie thea-
ters limited to approximately five percent of the municipality); Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding of zoning ordinance to decentralize the location of
adult entertainment businesses); Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1987);
S & G News, Inc. v. City of Southgate, 638 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (adult book-
stores and movie theaters restricted by zoning ordinance to only 2.3 percent of the city); SDJ
v. City of Houston, 636 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D. Tex. 1986); 15192 Thirteen Mile Road, Inc. v.
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nicipality has the police power authority"° to zone its land in the manner
considered best to serve the municipality's particular interests. 1 A munici-
pality's exercise of its police power authority is valid as long as the munici-
pality can show a rational governmental interest'" requiring the exercise of
such police power.'3 The Court has generally found a rational governmental
interest present in a municipality's preservation of the "moral" or "general"
welfare of its community.' However, when fundamental constitutional
rights are involved, as was the right of privacy in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 5 the normal rules of judicial deference toward zoning ordi-
nances do not apply. 6 The standard of municipal justification is pertinent
because at present, zoning ordinances are increasingly being used as a
means by which adult entertainment businesses are being regulated, even to
City of Warren, 626 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Mich. 1985). See also Developments in the Law -
Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1550-68 (1978) [hereinafter Zoning].
10. Police power authority is granted to the individual states by the tenth amendment of
the United States Constitution. In turn, the individual states delegate the authority to local
municipal governments. The tenth amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
11. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926) (a municipality
has the right to "govern itself as it sees fit, within the limits of the organic law of its creation
and the State and Federal Constitutions"). See also generally Renton, 475 U.S. at 52. The
Supreme Court, citing from Young, stressed that municipalities must have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems affecting the municipalities.
Id. See infra notes 23-47 and accompanying text.
12. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. The Court stated that the zoning ordinance at issue met
the rationality test. The Court further elaborated on the components of the rationality stan-
dard by stating that "before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, [it must be
shown] that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Id.
13. See infra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (a more recent applica-
tion of Euclid, holding that a zoning ordinance which prohibited more than two unrelated
persons from living together served a general welfare interest of the community). But see
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (an ordinance preventing cohabitation
by persons not more closely related than first generation did not serve a valid general welfare
interest of the municipality). See also infra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
15. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
16. Moore, 431 U.S. at 512 (fundamental constitutional right of family privacy could
not be regulated by mere rationality standard). See also Young v. American Mini Theatres,
427 U.S. 50, 75 (1976). Justice Powell, concurring, stated that it should be clear that where
protected first amendment interests are at stake, zoning regulations have no such "talismatic
immunity from constitutional challenge." Id. at 75. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 388-90 (1926). Euclid was decided on police power grounds and thus does not
control when free speech is involved in zoning. Id. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 528-43 (10th ed. 1980) (discussion that the "rational
basis" test is sufficient when nonfundamental rights are affected, but the review standard is
more stringent, when for example, first amendment rights are violated).
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the point of severe restriction. 7
This note initially discusses the historical development of municipal
zoning. 18 Next, a brief overview addresses the fundamental constitutional
right of freedom of speech-." Third, this note discusses the interaction be-
tween the judicial standards as applied to a municipality's right to zone and
the first amendment rights of freedom of speech and expression of adult
businesses.20 Fourth, this note addresses the resulting unconstitutionality of
the highly deferential zoning standard which is currently applied to adult
entertainment operators." To conclude, new judicial guidelines are sug-
gested which would apply the "time, manner, and place" standard more
stringently in order to minimize zoning's harsh effect on the availability of
reasonable operating sites for adult entertainment.2 2 In particular, this note
emphasizes and focuses on the establishment of guidelines to determine if a
municipality, when zoning adult entertainment, has allowed for reasonable
alternative channels of communication.
II. HISTORY
In order to lay a foundation for the discussion which follows, a brief
overview of municipal zoning 23 and first amendment speech 4 is appropriate.
Both zoning and first amendment speech have well-developed historical le-
gal precedents.2 While both speech and zoning are protected, each is scru-
tinized under a different legal standard by the judiciary.
A. Zoning as a Means to Regulate Land Use
The increasing complexities of modern life have had a dramatic effect
on the relationship between the government and private property owners.
Traditionally, a land owner had sole possession and control over the use of
his land.26 But as conflicting property uses have expanded between land
17. See cases cited supra note 9.
18. See infra notes 26-67 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 68-104 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 118-56 and accompanying text.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 157-203.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 29-47.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 68-78.
25. See infra notes 26-47, 68-104 and accompanying text.
26. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). The ancient doctrine at common law
was that ownership of one's land extended to the periphery of the universe - Cujus est solum
ejus est usque ad coelum. Id. at 260-61. See, e.g., 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
Blackstone described property rights as "that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any
other individual in the universe." Id.
[Vol. 22
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owners, the government has become actively involved in regulating land use
for particular social ends.27
1. History of the Power to Zone
Zoning has been the predominant means of governmental regulation of
private property. 28 The importance of zoning as a useful police power was
first recognized by the Supreme Court in 1926 in Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co.2 19 With Euclid, the Court initiated a change in attitude
toward expanding the scope of state and local police powers. 30 The village
of Euclid enacted a comprehensive zoning plan that restricted the location
of industrial development. 1 The Court held that the village's state-granted
police power authority was sufficient to sustain the overall zoning scheme
for industrial uses.3 2 After Euclid, zoning became so well-rooted in police
power authority that the Supreme Court has avoided invalidating any zon-
ing ordinance by holding that the ordinance exceeded the police powers on
which it was founded.33
Most zoning acts are based on the language of the Euclid era 34 and
permit zoning for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or
general welfare of the community which enacted the zoning ordinance. 5
27. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926) (prece-
dent set allowing municipal ability to zone for the general welfare of the community).
28. Zoning authority is founded in the police powers granted to the states by the United
States Constitution. The states' police power is then usually expressly delegated to local mu-
nicipalities through state legislation. Typically, zoning is comprehensive with districts affecting
an overall plan of the municipality, and the districts are then often cumulative in nature. For
example, an area zoned into districts will start out with light zoning which allows only residen-
tial building, and gradually get heavier throughout the remaining districts to allow more com-
mercial and industrial uses. See 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 9.14.
29. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
30. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87. The Court acknowledged that constitutional guarantees
never vary, however, the scope of their application must dynamically vary with the prevailing
conditions. What may have been rightfully rejected many years ago may be presently reasona-
ble and necessary. Id. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 205-1 to -2 (1985 & Supp. 1987); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-.855 (1986 & Supp. 1987). For a further view of state police power
delegation to local governments, see Cunningham, Land-Use Control - The State and Local
Programs, 50 IOWA L. REV. 367, 369 n.3 (1965) (collecting the enabling acts of the 50
states). See Zoning, supra note 9. Municipal zoning is granted under the states' legislative
delegation of their police power. Id. at 1429, 1443, 1444.
31. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379-80.
32. Id. at 387-88.
33. See Zoning, supra note 9, at 1443.
34. The Euclidean zoning language refers to a particular type of land use control char-
acterized by a "cookie cutter" pattern of rigid, rectangular districts which was upheld by the
United State Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 262 U.S. 365 (1926).
35. See, e.g., STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 1 (1926). For a summary of
zoning purposes that have received judicial approbation since Euclid, see D. HAGMAN, URBAN
19881
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The village of Euclid was divided into six classes of use districts, with each
district cumulatively defining more narrowly the type of uses allowed in
that district.3 6 The central concern in Euclid was whether the creation of
residential districts that excluded all industrial uses was valid.37 The Court
held that the community's health and safety would be promoted by separat-
ing the dwellings, diminishing traffic flow of vehicles, and reducing the in-
flux of strange persons into the residential neighborhoods.38 Therefore,
under the Euclid reasoning, although an intangible, the quality of life is an
interest that a community can attempt to control through zoning
regulations. 9
Several years after Euclid, the Supreme Court again acknowledged in
Berman v. Parker 0 that land regulation could promote intangible commu-
nity values that are spiritual, physical, and aesthetic, as well as monetary in
nature."1 In Berman, the District of Columbia authorized a redevelopment
agency to plan the redevelopment of certain areas of the district in such a
manner as to reduce or eliminate the blight with which such areas were
afflicted. The Court held that redevelopment to promote an area's quality of
life constituted a valid purpose for zoning.42 Again in Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas," the Court held that the legitimate concerns of zoning were met
in an ordinance which prohibited not more than two unrelated persons from
residing in the same house.4" Traditional family values would be served by
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 86-89 (1971). See Zoning, supra note 9,
at 1444. The United States Department of Commerce drafted the model act as a guide for
state adoption. The intent behind the Act was based on the zoning principles set out in Euclid.
Zoning, supra note 9, at 1444.
36. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 380, 379-83 (ordinance which affected the regulation of all
buildings as to size and location requirements). The ordinance construed in Euclid was an
example of cumulative or "hierarchy zoning." The most restrictive zone was the U-1 zone,
which permitted only single family residences, agricultural uses, and related activities. In all
other zones the uses were cumulative, meaning that the uses permitted in a more restricted
zone were also permitted in a less restricted zone. Id. at 381.
37. Id. at 390.
38. Id. at 391. See also Zoning, supra note 9, at 1450.
39. See Zoning, supra note 9, at 1451 nn.65-67 (compiling cases that have expressly
endorsed the use of zoning to obtain an overall use goal of a municipality). See generally D.
MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 70-75
(2d ed. 1985). For a further discussion of the development of zoning strategies, see I R. AN-
DERSON, supra note 5, § 1.14.
40. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
41. Id. at 33 (supporting the broad scope of police powers in the area of land control).
42. Id. The ordinance had the effect of prohibiting students near a university from "pil-
ing" into houses, and thus, destroying the present community's family atmosphere. Id.
43. 416 U.S. 26 (1974).
44. Id. at 29. But see Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The Court held
unconstitutional a zoning ordinance which infringed on the fundamental right of privacy.
Thus, although similar to Village of Belle Terre, the Moore ordinance infringed on a family's
fundamental right of privacy. The statute therefore was not entitled to the traditional judicial
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 [1988], Art. 12
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss3/12
ADULT ENTERTAINMENT
the zoning regulation's effect of promoting spacious and quiet neighbor-
hoods.4 5 Under these cases, municipalities have the means through zoning
to enhance and preserve the quality of community life for their residents.
Once zoning was recognized as a means to promote a community's in-
tangible interests in its residents' quality of life, safeguards became neces-
sary to prevent unnecessary governmental infringement on private lands.
Most municipal zoning power is granted by state zoning enabling acts.4
However, in construing zoning enabling acts, the judiciary has tended to
interpret the acts with an expansive view of the broad police powers from
which the acts are derived. 47 Police powers, however, must serve a rational
governmental interest in order to pass judicial scrutiny.
2. Standard of Review for Zoning
A municipality's exercise of its zoning powers is valid if the regulation
serves a rational interest of the local government.4 8 In Euclid, the Court
stated that the segregation of residential areas rationally served the commu-
nity's goals of promoting the health, safety, and general welfare of the vil-
lage. 49 This landmark case established not only that zoning of private prop-
erty was acceptable, but also that zoning was acceptable for any rationally
conceived governmental interest.
Several years after Euclid, the Court further developed the rationality
standard in Zahn v. Board of Public Works.50 In Zahn, the city of Los
Angeles established five zoning districts and classified the type of building
allowed in each district.5 1 A private property land owner brought suit and
deference allowed to zoning. Moore, 431 U.S. at 507, 508.
45. Moore, 431 U.S. at 507-08. A village zoning ordinance restricted the occupancy of
one-family dwellings to traditional families or groups of not more than two unrelated persons.
The ordinance was held to bear a "rational relationship" to the village's interest in promoting
a quiet place, with wide yards and few people. In general, wholesome traditional family values
were sought to be protected by the zoning ordinance. Id.
46. An example of a model act was drafted in 1926 by the United States Department of
Commerce and was called the STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT. See 3 R. ANDER-
soN, supra note 5, § 32.01 for the text to the Act. See also Cunningham, supra note 30; N.
WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW § 18.01, at 355 (1975). The Standard Act has been
adopted at one time or another by all 50 states and is still generally in effect in most of the
states. Id.
47. See, e.g., National Used Cars, Inc. v. City of Kalamazoo, 61 Mich. App. 520, 523-
24, 233 N.W.2d 64, 66-67 (1975); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 46-47, 400 P.2d 255,
261-62 (1965) (en banc); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis.
262, 267, 270, 69 N.W.2d 217, 220, 222, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
48. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926).
49. Id. at 391.
50. 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
51. Id. at 327.
1988]
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alleged that the zoning ordinance violated his constitutional due process and
equal protection rights.52 The Court announced that where zoning enact-
ments were fairly debatable as to their validity, deference should be given
to legislative discretion; 3 the legislature balances the interests of the pri-
vate land owner against the government's interest, and in close cases, the
legislature should not be second-guessed." As a result, after Euclid and
Zahn, zoning ordinances enjoy a presumption of rationality and must be
upheld unless it can be shown that the ordinance is clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable.
Since the rationality standard requires minimal judicial scrutiny, mu-
nicipal zoning ordinances are virtually immune from judicial interference .5
First, with its broad scope of police powers, a municipality has great au-
thority to enact restrictive zoning regulations. 56 Second, the "rational basis
test" merely requires a minimal showing of any legitimate governmental
interest in order to be held valid by the judiciary. 7 Last, any moral or
general welfare concern of a municipality qualifies as a rational governmen-
tal interest.5 8 As a result, municipal zoning has enjoyed great flexibility
with minimal judicial interference.
Furthermore, a rational, comprehensive zoning plan is valid as a whole
even if it infringes upon an individual's property rights. Zoning ordinance
provisions are usually stated in general terms59 which exclude classes of
uses. 60 As such, landowners within the class affected by a zoning ordinance
will be deprived of the unlimited use of their property. The effect of zoning,
however, is to create reciprocal benefits for property owners;61 for example,
52. Id.
53. Id. at 328.
54. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974). In zoning cases, the tradi-
tional attitude of courts, particularly federal courts, has been to defer to the local officials'
assessment of facts. Id. See Zoning, supra note 9, at 1445, 1559. Also, most municipal zoning
is legislative in nature and the:
Legislative facts are normally generalizations concerning a policy or state of affairs, City
of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971), and are not obtained in a formal
orderly fashion. No Due Process claims are present because legislative acts usually affect
a large number of persons, therefore normally ensuring that the government will not act
unreasonably against the populace.
Zoning, supra note 9, at 1559-60.
55. See Zoning, supra note 9, at 1443-45.
56. See supra notes 28-33, 48-49 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Zaher v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325, 327 (1927).
60. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 380 (1926). The Village of
Euclid had six zoning districts, each district level progressively excluded a greater number of
classes of uses allowed. For example, the lightest district would prohibit commercial and indus-
trial, and school uses, thus, constituting a purely residential area. Id.
61. See Nollan v. California Costal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (government must
[Vol. 22
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a homeowner in a residential area cannot build a factory on his property,
but he is also assured that neither can any of his neighbors.
The Supreme Court has stated that zoning ordinances affecting the
good of the community are valid when they impose only reasonable limita-
tions on the uses that may be made of a landowner's property.62 Moreover,
zoning cases reveal that unless a regulation destroys all viable use of the
property affected, no taking by the government will have occurred. 63 Under
the Court's rationale in Zahn, any zoning infringement imposed on a land-
owner fades into the overall rational purpose of the government so that the
general community's gain bars a claim for any individual losses.64
The normal rules of judicial deference do not apply, however, when
fundamental constitutional rights are also involved.6 The United States
Constitution guarantees the fundamental right of free speech to all individ-
uals.6" As a result, speech may not be regulated by the government unless a
valid content-neutral restriction is utilized. If a restriction is content based,
Jts review requires "strict scrutiny" - a compelling governmental interest
that cannot be satisfied through less drastic means. 67 If noncontent based,
such a restriction can reasonably regulate only the time, manner, and place
of such lawful speech. Regulations which infringe on free speech, therefore,
demand more than the mere rationality standard which is otherwise suffi-
cient for zoning.
compensate owner for property taken for the benefit of the public good); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 134-35 (1978) (rejecting the notion that the com-
plaining party had not in some manner benefited by the increased quality of life in the city
that was promoted by the zoning regulation).
62. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-89.
63. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(landmark zoning regulation prevented landowner from erecting any major structure, thus
greatly restricting the viable use of the property). See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning law caused 75% diminution in value of property and no
taking found); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87 % diminution in property
value).
64. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389.
65. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977). In striking down
East Cleveland's zoning ordinance, the plurality opinion stated that the Constitution prevents a
city from narrowly defining fundamental family patterns through zoning regulations.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." Id.
67. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972) (ordinance based on
content of speech failed to pass the strict scrutiny test); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. NEL-
SON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.40 (3d ed. 1986) (discussion of the strict scrutiny test which
requires a compelling governmental interest). See also Note, City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc.: Court-Approved Censorship Through Zoning, 7 PACE L. REv. 251, 253-57 (1986)
(discussion of strict scrutiny test).
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B. First Amendment Free Speech Protection
1. The Right to Free Speech
Freedom of speech is a fundamental right protected under the first
amendment of the United States Constitution.68 The framers of the Consti-
tution explicitly allowed for freedom of speech in order to promote an in-
formed arena for ideological public debate.69 The right of free expression
may not be penalized simply because the view expressed invites dispute or
creates dissatisfaction with the sovereign.7 0  The Supreme Court has
adopted the following statement made by Voltaire to summarize its zealous
adherence to first amendment principles: "I [may] disapprove of what you
say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."'7 1 Thus, protecting
the right to free speech is a very important aspect of the first amendment.
Freedom of speech also protects the public's right to receive informa-
68. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech; or of the press; or of the right of the people to peaceably assemble
and to petition the Government for redress of grievance." Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § I (the principles inherent in the first amendment also apply to state and local govern-
ments through the application of the fourteenth amendment).
69. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20 (1975). Karst agrees with Thomas Emerson in believing that the principle of freedom
of expression carries beyond the purely political realm and embodies freedom of expression in
the whole culture of society. Thus, freedom of expression is meant to include freedom of reli-
gion, literature, art, science, and all other areas of human knowledge and expression. Id. (re-
ferring to T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970)).
70. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 79 (1981) (quoting Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 894, 895-96 (1949)). "[T]he court must remain attentive to the guaran-
tees of the First Amendment, and in particular to the protection they afford to minorities
against the 'standardization of ideas . . . by . . .dominate political or community groups.'"
Id. Accord Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207, 1217-18 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (stat-
ing that simply because expression is sexually orientated does not affect its first amendment
protection rights); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1214 (5th Cir. 1982).
71. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976) (citing S. TALLEN-
TRYE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907)). See also E-Bru, Inc. v. Graves, 566 F. Supp.
1476 (D.N.J. 1983). Judge Sarokin elaborated on Voltaire's statement while ruling on a zon-
ing ordinance in Patterson, New Jersey:
Voltaire did not write: "I disapprove of what you say, but will defend to the death your
right to say it, unless the subject is sex." Nor did the framers of the United States
Constitution. So-called adult bookstores are established to sell merchandise intended to
arouse sexual passions. They also seem to arouse passions of an entirely different
sort. . . . [T]he depiction of sexual acts, most of which are legal, are condemned with a
furor. We will tolerate without a murmur a movie showing the most brutal murder, but
display a couple in the act of love and the outcry is deafening. This is not meant to be a
defense of the sleazy movies and adult bookstores which pander to the bizarre and devi-
ant, but it is a plea for perspective in deciding whether such materials genuinely warrant
an intrusion into the rights guaranteed by the first amendment.
Id. at 1477-78.
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tion."2 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,7 ' a pharmacist sought to advertise to the public concerning
his fees for goods and services. 7 4 The state sought to prohibit the flow of
information between the pharmacist and the public. The state urged that
purely economic price advertising would diminish professionalism among
the pharmaceutical profession to the public's detriment. 75 Although the
communication in dispute was purely economic, the Supreme Court held
that the consumer's interest in commercial information may be as impor-
tant, if not more important, than the current ideological information in the
marketplace of ideas.76 The general right to a free flow of information is
indispensable for a well-informed public regardless of whether the informa-
tion is commercial or political in nature.7 7
Although the public has a right to free speech, the government may
reasonably control the dissemination of information,7 8 provided that the
government complies with certain constitutional requirements. The judici-
ary has assumed the task of reviewing governmental regulations for compli-
ance with the Constitution.
2. Free Speech: The Standard of Review for Legislation Which Infringes
on First Amendment Rights
a. The Regulations Must be Content Neutral
The Supreme Court has recognized that first amendment speech may
not constitutionally be regulated on the basis of its content.7 ' The Court has
72. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (the right of the public to receive commercial speech).
73. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
74. Id. at 750-51.
75. Id. at 766-68 (the state was concerned that price wars would break out amongst the
pharmacists and that in order to achieve lower prices the quality of service would necessarily
decrease).
76. Id. at 763.
77. Id. at 765. Free speech is important in many aspects of a person's life. For example,
commercial enterprises play a substantial role in the United States. Such large scale operations
affect the public dramatically by affecting the economic world we live in, and as a result, the
public has a right to receive commercial as well as the traditional political dissemination of
speech. Id.
78. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984) (a municipality has the right to control speech through a reasonable time, manner, and
place regulation); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 645-46 (1981) (the State of Minnesota could reasonably regulate the where, when, and
how of speech dissemination on its fairgrounds).
79. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (dealing with state restrictions on residential
picketing); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (government regulations
affecting speech cannot be based on the content of materials protected under the first amend-
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consistently recognized that a sovereign may not suppress ideas by imped-
ing the free flow of protected speech. 80 The first amendment requires the
judiciary to remain attentive to the protection of minority interests.81 In
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 2 a city ordinance prohibited
picketing within 150 feet of a school unless the picketing involved a labor
dispute against the individual school to be picketed.8" The Supreme Court
held that the ordinance impermissibly prohibited speech on the basis of its
content and reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of subject matter restrictions
by citing a long line of historical precedent.8" When based on content, a
municipality's ordinance is subject to the utmost strict scrutiny by the judi-
ciary. Under Mosley, therefore, regulations affecting first amendment free
speech can generally be upheld only if the regulations are content neutral.86
b. Substantial Governmental Interest Unrelated to Speech
To determine if the government is acting in a neutral manner and is
not seeking to suppress ideas, the Constitution has been interpreted to re-
quire that three criteria be met. 8 First, the government must show that it
has a substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression
of ideas a.8  Second, the means utilized to promote the substantial govern-
ment); Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648-49 (safety regulation to maintain an orderly crowd flow at a
state fair was unrelated to suppression of speech); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (regulation of physical actions were not related to suppression of ideas). See also Zon-
ing, supra note 9, at 1550.
80. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (convic-
tion for wearing jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" held violative of first and four-
teenth amendments)); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (conviction for uttering de-
famatory words about American flag held unconstitutional); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (showing of malice is required to recover in defamation action); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (striking down Virginia statute that forbade attorneys to accept
compensation from organizations with no pecuniary right in case; statute held invalid as an
undue restriction on free speech); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (punishing persons
for speaking out on public issues currently before a grand jury, when such speech does not
constitute a "clear and present danger," is violative of the first amendment); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (ordinance barring speech which "invites" dispute held violative of
the first amendment); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (meeting held by advocate of
violence was held within the protection of the fourteenth amendment).
81. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4-5. The Supreme Court must remain attentive to the
guarantees of the first amendment and in particular to the protection they afford to minorities
against the "standardization of ideas ... by . . . dominate political or community groups."
Id. at 4-5.
82. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
83. Id. at 92-93 (the ordinance was to prevent noisy disturbances from interrupting
schools while in session).
84. See cases cited supra note 80.
85. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 87-89.
87. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
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mental interest must be narrowly tailored. 8 And third, reasonable alterna-
tive channels of communication must remain open for dissemination of the
speech affected. 80
An illustration of a neutral substantial governmental interest is de-
picted in United States v. O'Brien." In O'Brien, the United States govern-
ment asserted that a law providing for "in tact" draft cards was necessary
to promote the smooth, efficient functioning of the government in the organ-
ization of the armed forces.9" O'Brien had destroyed his draft card in viola-
tion of the law as a means of symbolically expressing his dissatisfaction
with the Vietnam conflict. The Supreme Court held that the government
had a substantial interest in promoting the smooth operation of the mili-
tary, especially during times of war or conflict.9 Therefore, O'Brien's con-
duct was subject to regulation even though his display of dissatisfaction was
intended to convey a message and indeed was perceived as a message by
observers. 93 When the primary motive, then, is not suppression of ideas, the
first prong of the time, manner, and place test is met.
In a more recent case, Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc.,94 the State of Minnesota maintained a substantial in-
terest, which had no relation to the content of the Krishna's speech, in regu-
lating the orderly movement of a crowd at a very large state fairground. 9"
The sheer volume of the crowd and the particular nature of the temporary
forum created a substantial safety concern for the State. The significance of
the promoted governmental interest, the Supreme Court held, must be as-
sessed in light of the characteristic function of the forum involved.96 As a
result, what constitutes a substantial governmental interest will vary de-
pending on the factual situation, and, in Heffron, the large crowd in a tem-
porary forum constituted a substantial governmental interest.
648 (1981) (safety regulation for orderly flow of people in a congested high traffic area). But
see Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96 (picketing ordinance was unconstitutionally content based). See
also Karst, supra note 69, at 28-35 (stating that Mosley adopted the principle of equal liberty
of expression).
88. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
90. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
91. Id. at 78-81 (substantial interest was in the ability of the government to locate and
identify people for national defense purposes).
92. Id. at 380, 382.
93. When speech and nonspeech are combined in the same course of conduct, a signifi-
cantly important governmental interest in the regulation of nonspeech can justify incidental
limitations on first amendment freedoms. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
94. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
95. Id. at 650-51.
96. Id.
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c. Narrowly Tailored
Secondly, even assuming that the governmental regulation promotes a
substantial governmental interest, the means employed must be narrowly
tailored to fulfill the governmental interest sought to be served.97 A Jack-
sonville zoning ordinance in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville," prohibited
all nudity from being displayed on outdoor movie theater screens that were
visible from any public place." The city had enacted the ordinance in an
attempt to eliminate purportedly objectionable films from the view of the
general public.1"0 The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance as vague
because the ordinance failed to take into account that nudity such as a
baby's bottom or a nude war victim was not obscene and was therefore
within the realm of protected expression.' The second prong of the time,
manner, and place restriction, therefore, requires that when a substantial
governmental interest is to be promoted, the means of regulation must be
narrowly drawn to guard against the abrogation of fundamental constitu-
tional rights." 2
d. Reasonable Alternative Channels for Communication
Lastly, in addition to showing that the means employed to promote a
substantial interest are narrowly tailored, reasonable alternative channels of
communication must remain open for dissemination of speech in order for a
time, manner, and place restriction to be valid.'03 The first amendment re-
quires that the public have open access to information and that the govern-
ment imposes no restrictions which cut off the public's "reasonable access"
97. Heffron, 452 U.S. 640; Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981)
(ban on all means of live entertainment failed as being not narrowly tailored). See Note, Mu-
nicipal Zoning Restrictions on Adult Entertainment: Young, Its Progeny, and Indianapolis'
Special Exception Ordinance, 58 IND. L.J. 505, 511 (1983). Mayo, Land Use Control, 33
SYRACUSE L.J. 401 (1982); Zoning, supra note 9, at 1550.
98. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
99. Id. at 206-07.
100. See, e.g., JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE § 330.313 (1972).
101. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213. The ordinance unnecessarily encompassed nudity that
was not indecent in nature. All portrayal of skin, regardless of the artistic or social acceptabil-
ity was banned. Id.
102. Id. at 214.
103. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (third prong of the
time, manner, and place standard calling for reasonable alternative channels of communica-
tion). See Superior Films v. Department of Education of Ohio, 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954)
(Douglas, J., concurring, stated that "[I]n this nation every writer, actor, or producer, no
matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor"). See, e.g.,
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957) (central concern of first amendment
is the need to maintain free access of the public to the expression); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 150, 153-54 (1959); Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 683-84 (1968).
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to information. Thus, the government may only impose restrictions on the
free flow of expression to the extent that the public maintains reasonable
access to the expression.' " As a result, the distributor of speech must retain
adequate communication channels to permit the public's unobstructed
access.
Admittedly, the government has the power to zone and to enact rea-
sonable time, manner, and place restrictions. A problem arises, however,
when apparently reasonable zoning regulations come into conflict with the
first amendment protection of adult entertainment.
C. Zoning Interaction with the First Amendment
It was not until the mid 1970s that zoning of adult businesses became
a serious concept for municipal legislative contemplation. 05 In 1976, the
Supreme Court in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 06 upheld a De-
troit anti-skid row ordinance'07 against claims of interference with the first
amendment rights of adult movie theaters. °8 The Detroit ordinance was the
beginning of the use of a novel concept to regulate the placement and oper-
ation of adult businesses partly on the basis of their "content."' 0 9 The regu-
lations are content based at least to the extent of singling out adult book-
stores and adult movie theaters on the basis of what they sell."' However,
more recently the majority of the Court has stated that the secondary ef-
fects of adult entertainment are the focus of the regulation rather than the
content of these regulated businesses.'
At present, the Court is purporting to utilize the reasonable time, man-
104. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (the protection of the first amendment is afforded both to the
source and the recipient of free speech).
105. Id. at 62-63. The Supreme Court through a plurality opinion upheld for the first
time a zoning restriction which the dissent and many commentators felt was based on the
content of expression.
106. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
107. DETROIT, MICH., ORDINANCE 742-G §§ 66.0000-.0103 (Nov. 2, 1972).
108. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 73-74 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (recognizing Detroit's ordinance as a unique content neutral time, manner, and
place restriction).
109. See generally FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (Stevens, J.)
(acknowledging that the Young Court had failed to hold a statutory classification unconstitu-
tional because it was based on the content of communication protected by the first
amendment).
110. This is evidenced by the fact that not all bookstores and theaters were contained in
the Detroit Ordinance. Rather only adult businesses were the subject of the restrictive regula-
tion. See supra notes 2-3.
111. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (seven Justices
stated that adult entertainment businesses are regulated on the basis of their negative second-
ary effects, such as crime and littering and not on the basis of their content).
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ner, and place first amendment standard. However, the misapplication of
the standard's third prong generates the practical effect of neglecting truly
reasonable alternatives for dissemination of adult entertainment. The weak-
ened application of the time, manner, and place test causes adult entertain-
ment businesses to be zoned by what one commentator has compared to the
mere rationality standard used in ordinary zoning cases. 1 '
In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,"3 Justice Stevens recognized
two starting points from which to view the regulation of adult entertain-
ment through zoning. One way is to presume that all municipal zoning is
constitutionally valid." 4 To rebut this presumption, the burden is on the
party trying to exercise expression in violation of the ordinance. The second
approach begins with the view that the party challenging the zoning ordi-
nance has his claim rooted in the first amendment." 5 The burden would
then lie on the local government to overcome a presumption of invalidity
and to show that a valid time, manner, and place restriction is present." 6
Under the time, manner, and place analysis, the path most appropriately
utilized is the second approach expressed in Schad by Justice Stevens. 1 7
III. PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE APPLICATION OF THE CURRENT
STANDARD
A. The Existing Standard Applied
The current highly deferential application of the time, manner, and
place standard does not adequately protect adult entertainment freedom of
speech rights since the Court allows cities to greatly restrict the number of
reasonable sites available for adult business operation." 8 The Supreme
112. See Stein, Regulation of Adult Businesses Through Zoning after Renton, 18 PAC.
L.J. 351, 352 (1987). Stein advances the opinion that adult business location ordinances after
Renton will no longer be subject to the "strict scrutiny" standard of Schad and O'Brien. Now
municipal zoning ordinances for adult businesses will be analyzed by a mere "rational basis"
standard.
113. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
114. Id. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 80.
116. Id.
117. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945). "Accordingly, a municipality
is subject to a standard of judicial review determined by the nature of the right assertedly
threatened or violated rather than by the power being exercised or the specific limitation im-
posed." Id. See also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68, 77 (citing Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977) (zoning powers "must be exercised within
constitutional limits")). See also, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71-72
(1976).
118. See Friedman, Zoning "Adult" Movies: The Potential Impact of Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theaters, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1295 (1976-77). Friedman anticipated that Young
would be the creation of a "censorial nightmare" for the entire motion picture industry be-
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Court recently decided City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.," 9 in
which two adult movie theater owners were denied the use of their property
for displaying adult movies. The theater owners were denied permission to
show pornographic movies because their property was located in restric-
tively zoned areas.120 The areas were zoned to regulate the dissemination of
statutorily defined "adult materials"; particularly, only adult movie theaters
were prohibited. 2
Under a relaxed time, manner, and place rationale, the Court con-
cluded that other reasonable alternative sites which met the zoning require-
ments existed from which movie theater owners could supply the public
with adult movies. 22 The appellate court had recognized, however, that of
the 520 acres that were non-restricted, a substantial part was occupied, not
for sale, or otherwise commercially unavailable to an adult movie theater
operator. 123 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and
held that the mere showing that the 520 acres of non-restricted land existed
was sufficient to uphold the validity of the zoning regulation.' 2 4 In light of
the appellate court's observation, that there were virtually no practical op-
erating sites, the prospect of obtaining a viable operating site is doubtful
after the Supreme Court's Renton holding. Thus, the Supreme Court is im-
properly starting from the presumption of zoning validity rather than from
the presumption of first amendment validity that requires the city to bear
the burden of showing that a substantial interest is being promoted through
legitimate means. 1 5
The time, manner, and place standard utilized by the Court is, on its
face, protective of adult entertainment. However, in application, protection
is inadequate. The Court states that it is utilizing the appropriate judicial
cause of the severe burdens imposed concerning what constitutes adult material and the lim-
ited locations from which dissemination could be made.
119. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
120. Id. at 44-45 (adult theater too close to residential area).
121. RENTON, WASH., ORDINANCE No. 3526 (1981).
122. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54 (520 acres, or about 5 percent, "easily" met the
time, manner, and place standard for reasonableness). But see Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1981) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
See also Note, supra note 67, at 269 (author notes the subtle softening of the language from
the O'Brien standard to the standard used in Renton).
123. See Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 534 (9th Cir. 1984),
also noted in, Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54.
A substantial part of the 520 acres is occupied by: (1) a sewage disposal site and treat-
ment plant; (2) a horseracing track and environs; (3) a business park containing buildings
suitable only for industrial use; (4) a warehouse and manufacturing facilities; (5) a Mobil
Oil tank farm; and, (6) a fully-developed shopping center.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 748 F.2d at 534.
124. Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
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standard, but in effect, as applied, the standard yields only protection com-
parable to the rationality standard utilized for zoning.12 A need exists for
the Court to diligently apply all of the factors of the time, manner, and
place standard together when reviewing a zoning ordinance which affects
speech rights. Furthermore, the failure of any one of the standard's factors
should render the ordinance invalid.
B. The Time, Manner, and Place Standard Applied to Adult Entertain-
ment: A Relaxed Standard
The time, manner, and place standard utilized in adult entertainment
cases is applied less stringently than in cases not involving adult entertain-
ment. Official recognition of the time, manner, and place test in the context
of adult entertainment occurred in Renton in 1986.127 The standard applied
in Renton requires a substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to
speech, narrowly tailored regulations, and no unreasonable interference
with alternative avenues of communication. 1 8 On its face this is apparently
the same standard found in Heffron, where the State of Minnesota sought
to regulate the location of speakers on the state fairgrounds. 12 9 Thus, the
foundation of the standard utilized for adult entertainment is not new, but
in fact, is a standard similar to that which is generally applied to regula-
tions affecting other first amendment speech.
A substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the content of
speech is the first prong of judicial review encountered by municipal zoning
of adult entertainment, and the governmental interest requires factual justi-
fication by the municipality. 80 The Detroit anti-skid row ordinance in
126. See Stein, supra note 112.
127. Prior to Renton, only the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Young voiced
adoption of the time, manner, and place standard. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976).
128. See supra notes 79-104 and accompanying text; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 67, § 16.47 (discussion of the time, manner, and place regulation).
O'Brien has a four-part, general test, but another test used by the courts is a three-part "clari-
fication" of the O'Brien standard. But both tests are sometimes considered to be the same test
because they have the same underlying general principles. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 67, § 16.47(a). But see Stein, supra note 112, at 352. Stein does not agree
that the three- and four-prong tests are in fact the same. The four-prong test of Schad v. City
of Mount Epharim and United States v. O'Brien utilize a "strict scrutiny" standard, which
establishes a presumption of constitutional invalidity that a municipality must overcome. The
three-prong standard of Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. and
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. rather has a "rational
basis" standard, which creates a presumption of validity on behalf of the municipality. Id. See
also supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
129. See Stein, supra note 112, at 352, 366 (discussion that the Heffron standard is less
demanding than the narrower O'Brien standard).
130. For a discussion of the importance of a municipality's factual record in zoning, see
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Young was specifically developed to disburse adult entertainment and pre-
vent the development of blighted areas in the city. " ' Detroit had studied
the problem in depth and had developed a complete factual record which
showed that concentrated adult uses promoted increased crime and caused
a general decline in the areas surrounding them.132 The drafters of Detroit's
restrictive adult entertainment zoning regulations relied heavily on the in-
formation obtained from the factual record which showed that concentra-
tion of adult businesses promoted the secondary effects of increased crime
and neighborhood decay.133 Therefore, the Detroit ordinance promoted a
substantial governmental interest that, although arguably not content-neu-
tral,134 was primarily neutral and was unrelated to the suppression of
ideas.13 5
A municipality need not develop its own specific factual record to sup-
port its substantial governmental interest in zoning as long as reliance is
made on other cities' factual records that are reasonably believed to relate
to the municipality.'3 6 Reasonable reliance, if used in good faith by a mu-
nicipality, adequately fulfills the first prong of the time, manner, and place,
free speech standard. 8 " However, a showing of actual reasonable reliance
by an enacting municipality on another municipality's factual record is not
always strictly enforced by the courts. For example, in a Sixth Circuit case,
15192 Thirteen Mile Road v. City of Warren,"a8 the City of Warren en-
acted a restrictive zoning ordinance which affected only adult movie theater
entertainment."19 The city had waited for the outcome of the Young deci-
Zoning, supra note 9, at 1558-62; Stein, supra note 112, at 373-75. See Tollis, Inc. v. San
Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1987); Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824
F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1987) (relevant evidence required by municipality to demonstrate that zon-
ing ordinance was intended to address secondary effects of adult businesses).
131. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The Detroit ordi-
nances which regulated adult bookstores and adult movie theaters were enacted as amend-
ments to the Anti-Skid Row Ordinance in 1972. Experts in real estate and urban planners who
promoted the regulations believed that dispersion of adult business would protect the quality of
life in the city's neighborhoods. Id. at 53-55. See generally F. STROM, supra note 2, § 4.03[2]
(discussion of whether to disperse or concentrate adult businesses).
132. Young, 427 U.S. at 55. Experts in the field of zoning are of the opinion that the
neighborhoods with concentrated adult uses attract undesireables. Id.
133. Id.
134. Content neutrality is still highly controversial, but for purposes of this note it is
assumed that the interest of regulating secondary effects is content neutral. See dissenting
opinions from both Young, 427 U.S. at 84, and City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 55 (1986) (claiming that the majority's opinion is misguided).
135. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
136. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51.
137. Id.
138. 626 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
139. WARREN ZONING ORDINANCE § 14.02(C) (1978), cited in Warren, 626 F. Supp. at
808-09.
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sion and had alleged reliance on the Detroit record; however, the Warren
City Council had not directly viewed or directly relied on the Detroit rec-
ord. But because Warren enacted a similar ordinance to that utilized in
Young, the Sixth Circuit held that implicit reliance on the Detroit record
by Warren's City Council was sufficient factual justification for enacting
the ordinance. 140 Although reasonable reliance on other cities' factual
records is permitted, the danger of losing fundamental constitutional rights
occurs when a municipality is not strictly required to come forth with a
factual record disclosing its actual reliance.
On the chance that a substantial governmental interest is present, the
second requirement of the time, manner, and place standard demands that
the means employed must be narrowly tailored, imposing no greater burden
on adult entertainment than is absolutely necessary to further the govern-
ment's interest. 41 A restrictive zoning ordinance that excluded all forms of
live entertainment was enacted by a borough in Schad. The substantial gov-
ernmental interest the ordinance was designed to promote was the avoid-
ance of the secondary problems that may be associated with live entertain-
ment, such as parking, trash problems, adequacy of police protection, and
medical facilities.14 2 Under the scant factual record supplied by the bor-
ough, the Supreme Court held that a total ban on all live entertainment was
not the least intrusive means to regulate any unusual problems that live
entertainment might create.1 43 The borough was required to reasonably
show that a more selective approach in serving its purpose would fail to
address the substantial interest of the government. Thus, the time, manner,
and place standard requires zoning of adult entertainment to be selectively
tailored to the problem addressed by the municipality.
Although requiring a substantial interest that employs narrowly tai-
lored means, the adult entertainment standard fails to consider adequately
that reasonable alternative channels of communication remain open for the
dissemination of speech. This third prong, in application to adult entertain-
ment expression, however, was relaxed most notably by the Court in Renton
and has created problems as to what constitutes actual "reasonableness" of
alternative channels for dissemination of first amendment expression.4
The potential for harm in leaving virtually no reasonable available sites
for dissemination of adult entertainment is demonstrated by the result in
140. Warren, 626 F. Supp. at 813.
141. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
142. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
143. Id. at 61-62.
144. See Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1987);
Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1987); Walnut Properties v. City of
Whittier, 808 F.2d 1331, 1337 (9th Cir. 1986).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 [1988], Art. 12
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss3/12
ADULT ENTERTAINMENT
Christy v. City of Ann Arbor.145 The City of Ann Arbor, Michigan, prohib-
ited the location of adult book stores on 99.77 percent of the property
within the city. Christy wished to open and operate an adult bookstore in
Ann Arbor; however, she was denied permission from the city because her
property was not located within the 0.23 percent of the city in which adult
entertainment was not restricted.14 6 The only other manner in which
Christy could disseminate adult books, movies, etc., was to open a "non-
adult" store where Christy could then sell "adult" material that comprised
less than twenty percent of the total merchandise sold. 47 The district court
held that the Ann Arbor ordinance allowed reasonable dissemination chan-
nels, even when Christy and her proposed bookstore were excluded from
over 99.77 percent of the city."' 8 Thus, under the Christy ruling, there is
the potential harm of greatly limiting the property from which adult en-
tertainment may be disseminated.
Similar to Christy, the possibility of a total adult entertainment prohi-
bition appeared in a recent Ninth Circuit ruling, Walnut Properties, Inc. v.
City of Whittier,49 where Whittier's zoning ordinance banned all adult op-
erating sites within the central business district of the city.' 50 In response to
the opening of an adult movie theater in the city, the City of Whittier en-
acted a zoning ordinance prohibiting the operation of any adult movie thea-
ters within the central city. Initially, the ordinance was struck down by the
Ninth Circuit because it created an undue interference with speech by
preventing any dissemination of adult entertainment.'"' However, the Su-
preme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case
for a rehearing.' 52 The Ninth Circuit has since reviewed the Whittier ordi-
145. 824 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1987).
146. See Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 625 F. Supp. 960, 963 (E.D. Mich. 1986), for
more complete facts to the case.
147. Id. But see Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 1983)
(forty percent allowance of adult material prior to the zoning ordinance taking effect held
invalid).
148. Christy, 625 F. Supp. at 967. The case was vacated by the Sixth Circuit and re-
manded for further findings of fact. See Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 484 (6th Cir.
1987).
149. 802 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1986) (text of case recently removed from the reporter at
the request of the court).
150. Id. at 1176. The logistical distance requirements make it physically impossible to
locate in the business district of the city. This would seem to invalidate the ordinance under
Renton because Renton held that adult entertainment must have a reasonable opportunity to
operate a business "within" the city.
151. Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 762 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1985) (af-
firmed district court's finding of unconstitutional zoning ordinance which affected adult movie
theater).
152. City of Whittier v. Walnut Properties, 475 U.S. 1042 (1986) (mem.) (vacated and
remanded in light of the Renton holding that allowed municipalities to "severely" restrict the
location of adult entertainment businesses because of their alleged detrimental secondary ef-
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nance in light of the current Renton decision and has vacated and re-
manded to the district court. " Despite the city's near total exclusion, the
remand suggests that Renton supports the view that the severe exclusion of
available sites for adult entertainment may be possible under the highly
deferential time, manner, and place regulation utilized by the Court.
At present, the Court should apply more strictly the time, manner, and
place test in reviewing regulations of adult entertainment. First, factual
records to justify a regulation's substantial governmental interest are a ne-
cessity, as was seen in Schad, in order to show, second, that a substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of sexually explicit ma-
terial does indeed exist.'" The record is also pertinent in verifying that the
zoning ordinance is narrowly tailored to directly serve the interest of the
government.1 55 Third and most important, reasonable alternative channels
of communication for adequate public access to adult entertainment are
necessary. 56 When the first amendment is involved, a strictly applied time,
manner, and place standard is a must.
IV. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE JUDICIARY WHEN REVIEWING
ADULT ENTERTAINMENT ZONING
A. A Need for Strictly Interpreting what Constitutes Reasonable Alter-
native Means of Communication: A Focus on the Third Prong of the Time,
Manner, and Place Standard
There are several factors which must collectively determine whether
alternative adult entertainment operating sites are reasonably available.
First, geographic availability; second, commercial viability; and third, eco-
nomic feasibility. While all of these factors are weighed collectively on judi-
cial review, at present the failure of one or more of the categories does not
cause a zoning ordinance to fail. One way to view the current adult en-
tertainment zoning standard is to say that the Court is paying "lip service"
to the free speech standard and then is utilizing, for all practical purposes,
a standard analogous to the "rationality" standard developed in Euclid. To
prevent this highly deferential standard from, in effect, applying to free
speech, the judiciary needs guidelines that are specifically applicable to zon-
fects on their surrounding communities). On remand, the Ninth Circuit considered Walnut on
appeal for a second time, vacated the district court's order, and remanded for further consider-
ation, again in light of Renton. Walnut Properties v. City of Whittier, 808 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.
1986).
153. Walnut, 808 F.2d at 1337 (remanded to district court for further findings and pro-
ceedings consistent with Renton).
154. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 73-74. See also Stein,
supra note 112, at 364.
155. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974). See supra note 130.
156. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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ing regulations which affect adult entertainment.
B. Reasonable Availability of Operating Sites
1. Geographic Availability
One aspect of what constitutes reasonable alternative channels of com-
munication in the time, manner, and place standard's third prong is
whether or not, geographically, land is available for operating an adult en-
tertainment enterprise. 157 Renton, a community with a population of ap-
proximately 32,000 people, contained no adult entertainment businesses
when the city council enacted a restrictive zoning ordinance that limited
adult movie theater operating sites to 520 acres, or approximately five per-
cent of the land comprising Renton. 15 The zoning ordinance restricted the
adult entertainment from locating within 1,000 feet of any school, park,
church, family dwelling, or residential zone.15 With a seven judge majority,
the Court held that Renton's adult movie theater zoning ordinance allowed
for "clearly reasonable" geographical operating sites by not restrictively
zoning adult businesses from approximately five percent of Renton. 1s0 Of
this remaining five percent, however, a majority of the land was either al-
ready occupied, not for sale, or otherwise unsuitable for an adult movie
business. 1 But the Court reasoned that as long as "some" land is physi-
cally not restrictively zoned, no matter how minimal, that land is available
as a potential operating site for adult entertainment expression., 6 Thus,
under Renton, any geographically available land, no matter how restrictive,
is a conclusive factor in determining that reasonable alternative sites are
available for adult entertainment dissemination.
To constitute reasonableness in the third prong of the time, manner,
and place standard, the judiciary should require a greater factual justifica-
tion when the geographical allowance for adult business is severely re-
157. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in Young).
158. Renton, 475 U.S. at 44, 54.
159. Renton, 475 U.S. at 45. The Renton ordinance called for prohibiting any adult
motion picture theater from locating within one thousand feet of any residential zone, single-
or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. id. at 44-45; RENTON, WASH., ORDI-
NANCE No. 3526 (amended 1982).
160. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54. But see infra note 161.
161. Playtime Theaters, Inc., v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984). The
appellate court did not dispute that 520 acres were outside of the restricted zone, however, the
court recognized that much of the geographically designated land was not reasonably availa-
ble. A substantial part of the 520 acres was occupied by: "(i) a sewage disposal site and
treatment plant; (2) a horseracing track and environs; (3) a business park containing buildings
suitable only for industrial use; (4) a warehouse and manufacturing facilities; (5) a Mobil Oil
tank farm; and, (6) a fully-developed shopping center." Id.
162. Id. at 932.
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stricted. In Young, the Supreme Court did not make an actual determina-
tion of how much land in Detroit was not restrictively zoned for adult
entertainment. Rather the Court concluded that there must be a myriad of
locations that are not restrictively zoned.1 63 The Court reasoned that the
Detroit zoning ordinance did not affect the overall number of adult theaters
nor the public's general access to such theaters."" While the Detroit ordi-
nance may not have unreasonably affected adult entertainment, the general
precedent of an "apparent myriad"' 61 of locations is not sufficient as a
guideline for judicial review of reasonable access under the current time,
manner, and place standard's third prong.
Since Renton, the Sixth Circuit has interpreted that the third prong of
the current time, manner, and place standard as applied to adult entertain-
ment businesses merely requires that some geographical land remains avail-
able. "6 For example, in S & G News, Inc. v. City of Southgate,6' South-
gate, a community comprised of 30,647 people, enacted a restrictive two-
part zoning ordinance." This type of two-part zoning ordinance initially
zones districts in which adult entertainment may operate16 Then secondly,
within these limited districts of the city, additional locational provisions are
enacted by the government to either disburse or concentrate adult
businesses.1 7 0
163. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35 (1976).
164. Id.
165. Justice Stevens used the "myriad test" in Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35. The footnote
reads in part: "There are myriad locations in the City of Detroit which must be over 1000 feet
from existing regulated establishments. This burden on First Amendment rights is slight." Id.
166. See, e.g., SDJ, Inc., v. City of Houston, 636 F. Supp. 1359, 1370 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
See supra text accompanying notes 160-62. See Walnut Properties, Inc., v. City of Whittier,
802 F.2d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 1986). No land was zoned in the central business district of the
city of Whittier. Even when considering the total acreage in Whittier, only a maximum of 1.35
percent of the land was available for adult theater sites. While Renton allowed approximately
five percent of its land for a population of 30,000 people, Whittier has only left possibly 1.35
percent of its city for 70,000 people. Thus, less than half the land was left for over twice as
many people in Whittier. Walnut, 802 F.2d at 1176. Walnut was vacated and remanded and
brought up for another appeal in which the district court order was again vacated and re-
manded. Walnut Properties, Inc., v. City of Whittier, 808 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1986).
167. 638 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Mich. 1986), affd, 819 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1987).
168. Id. at 1061, 1062 (the ordinance actually contains three parts when considering the
licensing provision applied to adult business operators).
169. Id. at 1063. The location of an "adult bookstore" and an "adult motion picture
theatre" is permitted only in a C-3 commercially zoned district. Id. See, e.g., SOUTHGATE
MICH. ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 5.153-5.74 (Jan. 30, 1984).
170. S & G News, Inc., v. City of Southgate, 638 F. Supp. 1061, 1063 (E.D. Mich.
1986), affd, 819 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1987). In addition to the general zoning districts, adult
uses must meet certain specific locational requirements. See, e.g., SOUTHGATE, MICH., ZON-
ING ORDINANCE, § 5.153 (1974):
(2) Location Requirements
(a) Not more than two .. .[adult) uses are permitted within one thousand (1,000)
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Southgate's particular zoning ordinance initially excluded regulated
adult uses from 97.77 percent of the municipality by allowing their opera-
tion only in C-3 zone districts."' Within this 2.23 percent of the municipal-
ity which was zoned C-3, the municipality further required that no two
regulated uses could locate within one thousand feet of each other, or no
one single regulated use could operate within five hundred feet of a residen-
tial dwelling unit.'7 2 As a result, the 2.23 percent of available land was
severely diminished by the additional disbursement requirement.
In interpreting Renton, the Sixth Circuit held that the Southgate ordi-
nance was valid because it allowed reasonable geographic operating sites.173
Thus, the Sixth Circuit found that the third prong of the reasonable time,
manner, and place standard was satisfied under Renton even though South-
gate allowed for proportionately less than one-half of the geographically
available land than was allowed in Renton.
Under the ambiguity concerning what constitutes reasonableness for
adult entertainment, the standard of looking solely to geographic outlets is
insufficient. The judicial recognition of a "severe restriction" test to land
access by adult entertainment businesses could place a heavier affirmative
burden on municipalities to come forth and prove by a preponderance that
reasonable access by adult businesses is available.7 4 The Sixth Circuit has
not required a total ban on adult businesses, but has adopted a "severely
restrictive" test which subjects regulations to the heightened analysis in
feet of each other unless the Board of Zoning Appeals concludes that the following crite-
ria are satisfied: That the proposed use will not be contrary to the public interest or
injurious to nearby properties; proposed use will not enlarge the development of a skid
row area.
(b) None of the. . . [adult] uses are permitted within five hundred (500) feet of any
building containing a residential dwelling unit except that this provision may be waived if
the person applying for the waiver shall file with the City Plan Commission [a] petition
which indicates approval of proposed regulated use by at least 50 percent of the persons
owning, residing or doing business within a radius of five hundred (500) feet of the pro-
posed use. (Amended 1/30/74).
Id.
171. S & G News, 638 F. Supp. at 1064 (of the 4,400 acres of land comprising South-
gate, 109 acres are zoned C-3).
172. In Southgate, the C-3 district is one of three commercially zoned districts that
comprise 109 acres of land or 2.3 percent of the entire geographical terrain in Southgate. Id.
at 1064.
173. Apparently the plaintiff did not argue the unavailability of geographical sites. Id. at
1066.
174. With a population of 30,000 people, Renton allowed a five percent geographical
allowance for adult movie theaters. Moreover, Walnut may possibly be held reasonable with
only a 0.16 to 1.35 geographical allowance for Whittier's population of 70,000 people. Walnut
reveals the potential harm that may result in restricting the reasonable access to available sites
for adult entertainment under the current judicial application of the judicial time, manner, and
place standard.
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Schad.17 5 With no such affirmative duty, a unique zoning ordinance in
Michigan attempted to effectively ban 99.77 percent of all the land in Ann
Arbor for exclusive adult entertainment dissemination.1 7 6 In Alexander v.
City of Minneapolis,77 an ordinance similar to that in Christy was struck
down by the Eighth Circuit.1 78 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that it would
not be practical to combine general release films and adult films in the
same theater.1 7 9 Under Christy and Alexander, a severe restriction thresh-
old would clarify the judicial standard of reasonableness so that uniform
results between the circuits would be possible.
In addition to geographic availability, another aspect which affects the
reasonableness of the third prong of the time, manner, and place standard
is the overall viability of sites available for adult entertainment. Viability is
broken down into two overlapping branches, commercial 8" and economic
viability. 81 Because commercial and economic viability can effectively ban
the operating of adult entertainment businesses, the third prong of the judi-
cial time, manner, and place review standard should scrutinize these
factors.
2. Viability of Geographically Available Land
Once it is determined that land is geographically available, the need
then arises to determine if a reasonable amount of the nonrestrictively
175. See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (when funda-
mental constitutional rights are involved, traditional judicial deference is improper, and a city
must come forward with a greater showing to justify its regulation). See also Christy v. City
of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1987) (ordinance which does not totally ban adult
businesses but which does have a severely restrictive impact is subject to the stringent judicial
analysis found in Schad); CLR Corp. v. Henline, 702 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1983). An ordinance
which severely restricted adult entertainment business was subject to showing a predominant
compelling governmental interest in order to retain the ordinance. This greater burden of proof
was utilized even absent a total ban. CLR Corp., 702 F.2d at 639.
176. The zoning ordinance was unique because an adult use was defined as a business
wishing to sell adult materials that comprised greater than twenty percent of its stock, floor
space, or movie running time. Thus, the ordinance did not activate until a business met the
adult use definition. As such, adult entertainment could be sold in small quantities throughout
the city. However, under Christy, the possibility of operating exclusively an adult entertain-
ment enterprise is virtually nil.
177. 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983).
178. Both the Minneapolis and Ann Arbor ordinances regulated adult entertainment
material by: 1) regulating what businesses would be controlled (those selling over a certain
percentage of adult material); and 2) regulating, in addition, where the business that met 1)
could be placed. See Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1987); Alexander v.
City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983).
179. Alexander, 698 F.2d at 939.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 186-94.
181. See infra text accompanying notes 195-203.
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zoned land is commercially viable for use by adult businesses.'82 Commer-
cial viability is determined by the overall effect of not unreasonably restrict-
ing adult entertainment speech. In Young, Justice Powell emphasized that
the reasonable time, manner, and place standard required the Court to con-
sider if the zoning ordinance in "any" way significantly affected the reason-
able dissemination of speech.' 88 Justice Stevens further stated that the re-
sult would be quite different if the ordinance had any effect of greatly
restricting lawful speech. s'8 The Detroit ordinance was upheld by the Court
because viable land remained reasonably available for adult movie
theaters.'
a. Commercial Viability of Sites Zoned for Adult Use
A lack of commercially viable operating sites creates the potential
harm of squeezing adult entertainment out of the free speech market. In
Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson,8 Atlanta enacted a zoning ordinance that
primarily restricted new adult businesses to the desolate outer fringes of the
municipality. The effect of the ordinance significantly interfered with the
ability of adult entertainment operators to obtain a viable operating site. 87
The court concluded that several factors affect the viability of operating
sites including reasonable access to the sites, safety of the sites, whether or
not landowners would sell land to operators of adult entertainment, and the
general overall location of the sites. 8 8 Moreover, the court recognized that
the practical effect of placing adult entertainment in commercially unviable
locations would cause adult enterprises to go out of business.
The Fifth Circuit also invalidated a similar ordinance in Basiardanes
v. City of Galveston,'89 for primarily the same reasons as in Purple On-
ion.'90 Since the effect of these zoning ordinances unreasonably interfered
with the number of commercially viable operating sites, the ordinances
failed the third prong of the free speech judicial standard. Under Purple
Onion, when commercial viability significantly affects the locational options
of adult businesses, the zoning ordinance is unreasonable since it fails to
meet the third prong of the time, manner, and place judicial standard.
182. See supra note 161.
183. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79 (1976).
184. Id. at 72 n.35.
185. Id. at 79.
186. 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
187. Id. at 1215-17.
188. Id. at 1224-25 (consideration of such factors that would have the effect of "squeez-
ing" adult entertainment establishments out of business).
189. 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
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At present, Renton does not consider the commercial viability of adult
operating sites as a factor for determining reasonable alternative means of
communication. In Renton, the Court held that the first amendment is not
concerned with the economic or commercial viability problems affecting
adult entertainment. 191 The majority of the Court reasoned that the first
amendment does not compel the government to insure access.192 However,
when a fundamental constitutional right is involved, commercial viability,
while not the exclusive factor, should play a role in the overall reasonable-
ness of the regulation. The dissent in Renton properly recognized that the
Renton ordinance is clearly unconstitutional as unreasonably restricting ac-
cess to viable sites.193 Therefore, by not considering commercial viability,
the Renton majority evidently applied a diminished free speech standard
which failed to acknowledge the fundamental rights of adult entertainment
expression guaranteed by the first amendment. 194
b. Economic Viability
The third factor affecting reasonableness is whether land is economi-
cally available for adult entertainment businesses. 95 At present, however,
even if there is sufficient geographically available land, Renton, which is
now followed by the lower courts, established that the land need not be
"economically available."' 1 6 The reasoning is that "first amendment rights
do not compel the government to ensure that adult theaters, or any other
speech related business, will be able to obtain sites at bargain prices."' 97
The failure to consider economics results because zoning is a common pro-
cess which potentially affects every commercial enterprise in some man-
ner.' 98 Therefore, land may be physically and commercially on the market
for sale, but the cost of purchasing or maintaining the land could be eco-
nomically impossible for an adult business operation. Thus, the Court has
refused to let economics present a successful challenge for unreasonable
191. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986). See Stein, supra
note 112, at 375. Stein emphasizes the ease by which a municipality can restrictively zone
adult businesses when no economic considerations are taken into account.
192. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
193. Id. at 64-65.
194. See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 438 U.S. 494 (1977) (fundamental
right of privacy not properly regulated under highly deferential zoning ordinance).
195. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54 (the Court was not receptive to this argument under the
facts of the case).
196. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54-55. That respondents must fend for themselves in the real
estate market, on equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees, does not give
rise to a first amendment violation. Id.
197. Id. at 54.
198. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
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interference."' 9
The tolerance of severe economic restraint may be appropriate when
judging a zoning ordinance that has no effect on protected speech, but when
a constitutional claim of suppression of the fundamental right of free
speech is raised, a focus void of all economic impact, no matter how severe,
is improper. In Young, Justice Powell stated that first amendment inquiry is
not concerned exclusively with economics, but rather looks to the effect of a
zoning ordinance on freedom of expression.20" The Detroit ordinance regu-
lated, but did not unreasonably restrict the overall availability of sites for
adult businesses. 01 Thus, economics, while not a sole factor, should prop-
erly play a role in evaluating the general reasonableness of the third prong
of the free speech standard.
In Renton, the Court held that adult entertainment operators must
compete on an equal basis with the general public in purchasing land and
that the first amendment does not require that the government afford bar-
gain prices to adult business operators.210 The dissent keenly notes, how-
ever, that a very restrictive zoning ordinance does not put theater operators
on the same footing as the general public.203 Thus, the economic impact is
not exclusive in determining reasonable availability of sites. But the analy-
sis is not complete until a further practical view of the effects of the ordi-
nance is determined by the courts. Economics need not play an exclusive
role in determining reasonableness, but since economics can effectively ban
reasonable access, it does need to play a role in the overall view of the
judicial free speech standard for adult entertainment.
V. CONCLUSION
When considering zoning ordinances that affect fundamental constitu-
tional rights, the judiciary must view the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the enactment of the regulation. When reviewing a municipality's
record, the courts are obligated to use the heightened scrutiny called for in
the reasonable time, manner, and place regulation. Specifically, the applica-
tion of the third prong of the time, manner, and place analysis needs to
consider the factors of geographic availability of land, commercial viability,
and economics as all affecting the right to reasonable access. Each individ-
ual factor should not be looked at as being conclusive in and of itself.
Rather, an overall balancing of the above factors is required before regula-
199. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
200. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 78 (1976).
201. Id. at 79 (outcome would be different if ordinance had the effect of severely re-
stricting speech).
202. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54 (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 78).
203. Renton, 475 U.S. at 65.
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tion of protected expression is allowed. As such, the Supreme Court needs
to reevaluate its current views on zoning of adult entertainment and view
such entertainment as fundamentally protected expression deserving of all
the guarantees granted by the Constitution.
DAVID J. CHRISTIANSEN
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